

**International  
Republican Institute**

**UKRAINE**  
**Election Observation Report**  
**March 27, 1994**



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**INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE  
UKRAINE ELECTION OBSERVATION  
PARLIAMETARY ELECTIONS  
MARCH 27, 1994**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The International Republican Institute (IRI) sponsored a 15-member delegation to observe the election of deputies to Ukraine's Supreme Council (Parliament) on March 27, 1994. IRI observers convened in Kiev for briefings by officials of Ukrainian political parties, representatives of the Central Election Commission (CEC), Ukrainian civic organizations, election law experts, candidates, and U.S. Embassy officials. Observers then deployed to five additional cities with geographic, political and ethnic diversity: Odesa, Simferopol, Lviv, Kharkiv, and Zhytomyr. Before observing election day activities in their respective cities, delegates met with local representatives of political parties, Ukrainian media, domestic monitoring groups, district electoral commission officials, candidates, and voters.

This report contains 21 recommendations for improving future elections in Ukraine. These recommendations will be forwarded to the appropriate Ukrainian and American officials in a constructive effort to help Ukraine examine its electoral process in anticipation of presidential and local elections on June 26, 1994, and parliamentary repeat elections in 112 districts on July 24, 1994\*.

The pace of democratization and reform in Ukraine is painfully slow, but can gain strength over time. Ukraine's transition to democracy is clearly dependent not only on free elections but also on, among other factors, its ability to create an economic system that allows people to build better lives for themselves and for their families.

It is our sincere hope that Ukraine will accelerate the empowerment of its people and move quickly with economic and political reform so that all of its citizens can reap the benefits of a government responsive to the electorate. Only then will Ukrainians have the democracy that they so richly deserve.

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\* Repeat voting (popularly known as a run-off election in the United States) occurs when a candidate fails to receive a majority of votes cast in a district and the votes of at least 25 percent of the district's registered voters in the general election.

A repeat election is held when a district fails to achieve the 50 percent minimum turn-out requirement in the general election and when a candidate fails to receive 25 percent of the votes of a district's registered voters during repeat voting.

## II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ukraine's tumultuous history of occupation and division has led to a special sense of national identity as well as to strong allegiances to Russia. On August 24 1991, Ukraine declared itself an independent nation, just days after the failed coup against Gorbachev. On December 1, 1991, Ukraine held a nation-wide referendum on independence as well as a presidential election. The result was a vote in favor of independence of over 90 percent and the election of Leonid Kravchuk, then President of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and former Communist Party ideology secretary, as President with 61 percent of the vote.

For all but a few years, Ukraine has been a nation that has been continuously divided among its more powerful and conquering neighbors. In the mid-17th century, Ukraine was divided between Russia and Poland. When Poland itself was partitioned in the late 18th century, Ukraine was again divided between the Russian and the Hapsburg empires. When both empires collapsed at the end of the World War I, two independent Ukrainian states were established—one in the former Russian Ukraine and the other in the former Hapsburg Ukraine. Ukraine enjoyed a brief period of statehood between 1917-1920. However, hopes of continued independence vanished in 1918 when Soviet rule slowly began to take over the region with the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

In 1940, Stalin seized western Ukraine as part of the Soviet-Nazi pact that divided Poland. The Red Army moved into western Ukraine, waging war with nationalist forces and killing millions of Ukrainians in revenge for their earlier support for German forces. From this point forward, Ukraine was to be ruled by Moscow's iron fist.

In 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev reassigned Crimea to Ukraine as a gesture of solidarity between the two republics. Crimea had been part of Russia for at least two centuries. This reassignment was met with a certain degree of resentment by Crimeans and Russians alike. This resentment is still evident today. Partial self rule was established to keep Russian nationalist sentiments in Crimea, as well as in Moscow, at ease. Crimeans enjoy the privilege of electing their own President and their own Parliament to govern Crimea. They also enjoy the privilege of electing a President and a Parliament to govern Ukraine. Ukraine, however, enjoys the ultimate privilege of annulling any Crimean laws that contradict Ukrainian interests.

The rationale behind the partial self rule plan appears to have failed. About 70 percent of Crimea's 2.7 residents are ethnic Russians, and most want to be reunited with Russia. In January 1994, Crimeans elected a new president, Yuri Meshkov, who promised to do just that. If the economy in Ukraine continues to deteriorate and living standards continue to decline, the separatist movements alive in Crimea, as well as in parts of eastern Ukraine, will continue to gain strength.

In the absence of a new constitution, Ukraine continues to operate under the constitution that existed in the Soviet era when Ukraine was a republic of the USSR. That document has been amended substantially but does not establish clearly separate branches of government.

Although several drafts of a new constitution have been circulated, Ukraine has made no progress in its adoption or even on a mechanism--referendum or act of Parliament--to consider its adoption.

The former Ukrainian Supreme Soviet renamed itself the Supreme Council of Ukraine (Parliament) and continued to operate as the sole legislative body of the country. Membership of that body and local governing bodies had been elected in March 1990 when Ukraine was still part of the Soviet Union. New parliamentary and local elections were not due under the old system until 1995.

In the Fall of 1993, the coal miners of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine began a series of strikes demanding new elections due to deteriorating economic conditions. The government acquiesced to these demands and began to debate a date and process for new elections, thus setting the stage for the March 27, 1994 parliamentary elections.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

As a matter of policy, IRI does not make simple findings as to whether an election can be categorized as free and fair. The IRI delegation found the elections for Ukraine's Supreme Council (Parliament)--the first since independence from the USSR--to be an important first step in Ukraine's development as a democracy. IRI did conclude that the anti-party bias of the law that governed Ukraine's parliamentary elections and the administration of that law by the Central Election Commission resulted in an election process that was a missed opportunity to advance significantly the institutions and practices indicative of a democracy.

Refining election laws is a never-ending process. Even countries with a long history of free and competitive elections suffer from imperfect electoral systems and practices and continually seek improvements in the laws and traditions that govern their elections.

The weaknesses of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine had their origins in the new election law adopted by Parliament in November 1993. The law was passed in a fractious and acrimonious atmosphere by a vote of 245 to 6, with many pro-democratic deputies walking out in protest. It included certain provisions that set the stage for a complicated and confusing electoral process.

The absence of a proportional system of representation and a nomination process that created an inordinate number of independent candidates resulted in the notable absence of debate on issues of national concern and importance. In addition, the election law discriminated against political parties that conventionally serve as catalysts for formation of consensus on national issues. As a result, the new Parliament will begin work without a national mandate on the course to follow as it addresses the serious problems facing Ukraine.

The election law established the Central Electoral Commission as "the highest electoral body on the organization and conduct of elections." In addition to the specific responsibilities given to this body, there was an implicit mandate to assure that elections were conducted in a manner that promoted the democratic process. IRI observed that during the course of the election, the CEC met many of its statutory responsibilities. However, it, too, missed opportunities to develop, advance, and consolidate political institutions and practices that are a necessary part of a flourishing democracy. These missed opportunities resulted from a series of decisions made by the commission that failed to recognize the special needs of a developing democracy.

Although the election process is not over, the number of deputies elected during the general election and repeat voting (run-off elections) exceeded the required quorum of 300. With this quorum, Ukraine has a new Parliament. This is a critical achievement at this point in the development of Ukraine as a new and independent nation.

IRI applauds the courage, commitment and spirit of optimism of many candidates who participated in the political process for the first time. Notwithstanding some isolated incidents,

we commend the citizens of Ukraine for their peaceful conduct during the campaign period--a period marked by severe economic hardship and potential political uncertainty. Further, we salute Ukrainians for repeatedly returning to election polls in numbers sufficient to overcome restrictive turnout requirements imposed by the election law. Finally, we acknowledge the efforts of the Ukrainian government to promote ethnic harmony throughout the campaign period.

Ukraine now faces a critical test in its attempt to consolidate its independence and become a functioning nation. The problems facing the country require consensus by its political leaders. They must strive to overcome regional and ideological differences to forge a path to move ahead and to deal with the problems that have been brought about by the tremendous change of the last five years.



## IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

### System of Representation

**Issue 1:** When Parliament adopted a new election law in November 1993, it retained the unicameral legislative structure it had during the time when it was a republic of the Soviet Union. The election law provided for 450 single-mandate districts. Representation by single-member seats, rather than a mixed system of single member representation and proportional representation by political party, results in the absence of deputies who can speak for the interests of the nation as a whole and stunts the growth of national political parties that serve to unite and clarify the concerns of the entire population.

**Recommendation 1:** *As Ukraine debates a new constitution and the nature of its governing institutions, consideration should be given to a mixed system of single mandate representation and proportional representation of political parties.*

### Candidate Registration

**Issue 2:** Candidate nomination methods encouraged a proliferation of independent candidates, created procedural obstacles for political party candidates, and facilitated nomination of labor collective candidates. Nascent political parties were required to nominate candidates in 450 separate local organizing meetings, rather than in regional or national nominating conventions. This bias in favor of unaffiliated independent candidates and against representative political organizations made it difficult for voters to understand clearly and distinctly their choices in the electoral process.

**Recommendation 2:** *The candidate registration process should include provisions for political party nomination through national or regional nominating mechanisms. The registration process for parties should not include administrative procedures more complex or burdensome than those of other nominating entities.*

**Issue 3:** The election law allowed independent individuals access to the ballot by essentially requiring only 300 signatures of support in districts with populations in excess of 85,000. This relatively easy access to the ballot resulted in inordinate numbers of candidates--an average of 13 per district, with some districts as high as 31. Candidates should have a reasonable minimum base of support to give voters realistic choices and to eliminate confusing and lengthy ballots.

**Recommendation 3:**

*Access to the ballot should include requirements that demonstrate a minimum base of support and seriousness. Nomination should come from viable, representative political parties. Independent candidates should be required to gather petitions of support in numbers that demonstrate substantial support. The practice of nominating candidates from labor collectives is a holdover from the old regime that should be discarded. Rather, groups of workers should be able to nominate candidates through the petition process.*

**Minimum Turn-Out Requirements/Candidate Eligibility**

**Issue 4:**

One anomaly of a democratic process is the right of every citizen not to vote. In Ukraine, however, a valid election in each district required a turnout of at least 50 percent of the district's eligible voters. In order for a candidate to be elected, he/she had to receive a majority (50 percent plus one) of the votes cast and the votes of at least 25 percent of the district's registered voters. Elections in districts that did not achieve the 50 percent minimum turn-out requirement were considered void. Candidates in districts in which elections were void are prohibited from running in repeat elections as are candidates who did not receive a majority and 25 percent of the vote in the repeat voting (run-off election).

This minimum turn-out requirement ignored the rights of voters either not to vote or to vote against all candidates as a statement of protest. It also can create an unnecessary constitutional crisis if a sufficient number of members are not elected to constitute a valid Parliament. Further, it extends unnecessarily the election process by requiring repeat elections that result in additional expense, confusion and burden on the citizenry.

**Recommendation 4a:**

*The eligibility of candidates to run in a repeat election should not be linked to voter turnout.*

**Recommendation 4b:**

*Minimum turnout thresholds should be discarded. If voters are provided free and unencumbered access to the polls, those who participate will constitute a valid mandate.*

**Campaign Finance**

**Issue 5:**

Democratic elections require vibrant campaigns that allow candidates to communicate with voters and adequately present themselves and their ideas to the public in an unencumbered manner. The election law restricted campaign spending to 6 million karbovanets (equivalent to \$160 at the time of the election)

and required that campaign expenditures be disbursed through a process controlled by local electoral commissions. In some districts this amount was insufficient to purchase one minute of advertising on independent television or a one-page ad in an independent newspaper. Printing costs for literature sufficient to reach voting populations in excess of 85,000 could also easily exceed this amount. This unrealistic spending limit either stifled communication between candidates and voters, or forced candidates to violate the law in the very process of trying to become lawmakers. It also resulted in candidates' being dependent on state media in order to communicate with voters. Such a situation is fraught with the potential for abuse by those in authority.

**Recommendation 5:**        *Campaign spending limits should be set at reasonable levels to allow candidates to conduct vibrant campaigns and to communicate adequately with voters.*

**Issue 6:**        The campaign finance provision also required that campaign funds be disbursed through mechanisms controlled by local electoral officials. This allowed intrusive monitoring of campaigns by existing authorities and unnecessarily complicated the process of funding a campaign.

**Recommendation 6:**        *Campaign funds should be controlled by the candidate. In order to assure compliance with finance limits, the law should require public disclosure of all sources and expenditures of campaign funds.*

**Issue 7:**        Although the law established specific campaign finance limits, it did not address how those limits applied to a second round of voting should it be necessary. This ambiguity resulted in wide variation in the interpretation of these limits in regard to repeat voting (run-off elections).

**Recommendation 7:**        *The law should establish separate finance limits for general elections as well as for repeat voting (run-off elections) if it is required.*

### Voting Procedures

**Issue 8:**        The election law included detailed requirements for voting procedures to be followed on election day at the polling station. In contrast, only one sentence of the law referred to voting before election day and did not address the procedures of such "pre-term" voting. Observers noted wide variation in the volume of pre-term voting that occurred throughout the country. They also noted wide variation

in the control and tracking of such voting by polling station commissioners. In many cases, the ballots cast in the pre-term period were mixed with ballots cast on election day during the ballot count. In those cases in which pre-term votes were counted separately, the percentage of votes cast for different candidates was not consistent with the votes cast on election day.

**Recommendation 8:** *If pre-term voting is retained in future elections, the law should specify clearly the time period in which pre-term voting should occur, require that ballots cast through pre-term voting be secured in separate ballot boxes and counted separately from other ballots, and require that pre-term voters sign a statement with the date of the vote and justification for voting pre-term.*

**Issue 9:** Citizens residing outside Ukraine on election day were allowed to vote, but all were assigned to one electoral district (District #1 in Kiev City). The assignment of these voters was made by the Central Electoral Commission without informing the candidates in District #1 until one week before election day. Candidates in this district were not able to communicate with these voters. Additionally, voters abroad were denied the opportunity to vote for candidates who represented their domicile in Ukraine.

**Recommendation 9:** *Administration of the election process should allow voters living abroad to cast ballots in the district in which they previously maintained a residence.*

**Issue 10:** The election law provided for "mobile" ballot boxes to be taken to the residences of voters who were unable to go the polling station "due to health or other serious reasons." This practice can be viewed as an inclusive practice that allows all citizens access to the electoral process. However, it is by its nature subject to abuse. Observers noted wide variation in the number of votes cast through the mobile ballot box procedure, the number of times a day the box was taken from the polling station, the number of mobile ballot boxes used, whether the mobile box ballots were counted separately, and, in some cases in which those ballots were tabulated separately, the results differed significantly from the results at the polling station on election day.

**Recommendation 10:** *If the mobile ballot box voting procedure is retained, the law should specify that only one mobile ballot box per polling station be used; that the box leave only once during the day at a pre-determined time; and that ballots from the mobile box be counted separately. The law should remain in place requiring that more than two commissioners accompany the box and that observers*

*have the right to observe the mobile ballot box voting and counting processes.*

**Issue 11:** While the law foresaw that voting would occur by members of the military, it did not require them to vote at civilian polling stations. Polling stations for military personnel were situated primarily inside military installations. As a result, many domestic and international observers were denied access to military polling stations for security reasons.

**Recommendation 11:** *The election law should require that members of the military vote at civilian polling stations or that polling stations be set up outside secure installations so that voting can be observed. Situating polling stations inside secure boundaries that are off-limits to observers should be prohibited.*

**Issue 12:** The law required a "negative" voting methodology--crossing out the names of those candidates the voter did not wish to elect. This is a practice retained from the Soviet era. Voting should be an affirmative act whereby voters cast their ballot for the candidate of their choice. Negative voting in a situation of multiple candidates--as was the case in the general election--unnecessarily provided opportunities for error by the voters. Observers noted excessively large numbers of invalid ballots in the general election because of this requirement. In some districts, invalid ballots constituted as high as 20 percent of the total ballots cast.

**Recommendation 12:** *The law should require that ballots be designed so that voters can indicate with one mark the candidate for whom they wish to vote. This change should be accompanied by an effective explanatory public education program.*

**Issue 13:** The election law did not specify procedures to be followed for the printing, storage, or distribution of ballots, although the law did include procedures that required that the ballots be marked at the time of voting by a polling station commissioner as well as verification of that mark during tabulation. Nevertheless, more explicit procedures on ballot security could enhance confidence in elections.

**Recommendation 13:** *Procedures on the printing, storage and distribution of ballots should be set forth in the law. In addition, observers should be guaranteed the right to witness these processes.*

### Provision of Full and Open Information

**Issue 14:** Although the CEC had a list of all candidates standing for election throughout Ukraine several weeks before election day, it consistently denied requests from the press and from citizens to publicly release the list. The provision of a master list of candidates and the accompanying information would have allowed the press and the voters the opportunity to analyze and discuss the nature of their election from a national perspective. A member of the Journalists Union told one IRI observer that the press relations and public information service set up by the CEC had provided almost no information and had been unresponsive to numerous requests for basic information.

**Recommendation 14:** *The election law should require the CEC to publish a list of all registered candidates. Other factual information that is part of the registration process should be provided to the press and the public.*

**Issue 15:** The election law required minimum participation by registered voters for an election in a district to be considered valid, and a minimum number of votes of registered voters to be received in order for a candidate to be elected. Thus, the number of registered voters was a critical element in determining whether election results were manipulated. In addition, the law required that district boundaries be set so that populations were equal within plus or minus 12 percent. Publication of these statistics would have provided a baseline to judge adherence to these requirements and to facilitate monitoring by the press and observers.

**Recommendation 15:** *The law should require the CEC to publish, in a timely manner and on a nation-wide basis, voter lists within each electoral district.*

### Non-Partisan Observer Groups

**Issue 16:** The election law provided groups of non-partisan citizens the opportunity to serve as independent observers throughout the election process. This is a positive aspect of the election law. Encouraging citizens to act as guardians of the election process, in addition to individual candidates or parties representatives, promotes a democratic culture. It also makes them an active participant in the election process. One group petitioned the CEC weeks before election day seeking recognition and accreditation as a national domestic observer group. After placing a series of conflicting and burdensome conditions on the group's registration, the CEC refused to accredit them barely two weeks before election day. It then issued a regulation concerning such groups that forced them to hold

founding meetings and seek recognition in more than 30,000 polling station divisions. This action stifled the development of an institution that would have greatly advanced the democratic process in Ukraine.

**Recommendation 16:** *The election law should continue to permit groups of non-partisan citizens the right to serve as observers of the election process. The law should establish clear criteria for the registration of such groups at the national level and require the CEC to accredit such groups when those criteria have been met.*

#### Response to Reports of Election Violations

**Issue 17:** The IRI delegation was unable to find a single instance in which the CEC responded to reports of violations or petitions to correct violations before election day. An election process that provides safeguards against abuse and violations of the law on paper but has no functioning system of adjudication and resolution cannot be judged to be a democratic one. Without protection and sanctions against those who would undermine the democratic process, the average citizen is helpless against those in authority. Some three weeks after the general election, the CEC stated that it was inadequately staffed to address the reports of violations that it had received.

**Recommendation 17:** *The law should provide for more explicit procedures and penalties for violations that occur during the election process. The CEC should have adequate staff to investigate and adjudicate allegations of election law violations.*

#### Date of Repeat Voting (Run-Off Elections)

**Issue 18:** After March 27, election, the CEC determined that repeat voting (run-off elections) could occur on any Saturday or Sunday within the two-week period (April 2, 3, 9 or 10) following the general election. Further, the choice of the day to hold repeat voting was determined by the respective district electoral commissions. This was a reasonable interpretation of the law but resulted in elections being held on four different days throughout Ukraine. Those districts that held repeat voting on April 2 or April 3 did not provide sufficient time for the remaining two candidates to run an effective campaign.

**Recommendation 18:** *The election law should require that repeat voting (run-off elections) throughout Ukraine be held on the same day. There should be a sufficient interval between the general election and*

*repeat voting to enable the remaining candidates to conduct campaigns.*

### Local Administration of the Election Law

**Issue 19:** IRI observers were impressed by the openness, conscientiousness, friendliness, and helpfulness of many polling station officials. Polling station commissions were well organized and took their duties and responsibilities seriously. Notwithstanding this general attitude, IRI did observe polling station officials who violated the law. The most consistent examples were allowing individuals to vote on behalf of family members, issuing multiple ballots to individuals who presented more than one passport, and issuing ballots to individuals who failed to produce any form of identification.

Such practices occurred during the Soviet era but are now explicitly prohibited by law. When these practices were brought to the attention of voting officials, they frequently blamed voters for failing to recognize the importance of adhering to the election law.

**Recommendation 19:** *The election law must be enforced by polling station officials. Greater effort should be made to educate polling station officials and voters on the importance of the "one man/one vote" concept. Compliance with the law in this regard is in the hands of the polling station official who has the authority to disburse ballots. Therefore, consideration must be given to imposing strict penalties on officials who violate the law.*

### The Media

**Issue 20:** No democracy can exist without a free and independent media. Because of the economic conditions existing in Ukraine, independent newspapers and television stations suffer from a lack of advertising revenue and paper shortages. These factors have stunted the growth of independent sources of information and have left the general population dependent on state print and broadcast media. Observers found that state media in general attempted to adhere to the requirements of the law to provide equal access to candidates but were told about regional variations in adherence to these requirements. Because of the financial limits, it was impossible for candidates to adhere to the law and communicate with voters by advertising on independent media outlets.



IRI was impressed particularly with the attempt to establish an independent information source by a group called "Elections '94." Observers found this group to be dedicated to the principles of independent and free journalism. Further, observers found that Elections '94 was frequently the only source of timely and generally accurate information on the election process. However, observers were particularly dismayed by repeated statements by the Chairman of the CEC condemning this organization and the CEC's refusal to provide information to it.

**Recommendation 20:** *Creation of free and independent news organizations that provide objective but critical information is vital in the development of a free society. National and local authorities should play a positive role in moving media institutions toward greater freedom and independence. The new Parliament should look for additional legislative safeguards that guarantee freedom of the press and encourage the development of independent sources of information.*

### Political Parties

**Issue 21:** For a variety of reasons, this election represented a missed opportunity for the development of political parties as institutions to unify and represent divergent national interests. The majority of deputies in the new Parliament will not be affiliated with any recognized party nor will they have a mandate from the citizens on future policies to address the problems of the nation. Preservation of democracies requires strong institutions that can survive times of challenge and crisis. One of those institutions is a political party system that is dynamic, competitive, and representative of the citizenry.

Although the parliamentary elections did not advance the development of strong political parties, perhaps the new Parliament can begin to form blocs and coalitions that advance the concept of unified and competitive philosophies.

Moreover, the new Parliament must govern effectively the new nation of Ukraine and constructively address its problems. A democratically elected body that cannot function because of the inability to form stable majority viewpoints will not serve the citizens of Ukraine. New members must seek to find common interests and coalesce around those rather than focus and split on differences.

**Recommendation 21a:** *Political parties must focus on building broad bases of support by building structures at the regional and local level to help develop distinct party platforms, recruit candidates, and mobilize popular support.*

**Recommendation 21b:**

*New members of the Parliament should seek to find common interests, viewpoints, and objectives and form formal caucuses and organizations around them. These organizations should hold regular meetings, form structures of leadership, recruit professional staff with technical expertise, and regularly communicate with the public through press releases, forums, and conferences.*

## V. ELECTION RESULTS

### Candidate Profile

Of the 5,833 registered candidates, 62 percent were independents, 27 percent were nominees of labor collectives, and only 11 percent were registered through the political party mechanism.

Even though many candidates did not register as candidates of a party, they did list a party affiliation in the biography they were required to submit to the CEC. When looking at party affiliation, as opposed to form of registration, 6.7 percent of the candidates were affiliated with the communist party, 4.1 percent with Rukh, 3.1 percent with the Socialist Party, 2.4 percent with the Ukrainian Republican Party, 1.4 percent with the Liberal Party, and 1.2 percent with the Democratic Party. The remaining candidates, over 80 percent, were affiliated with other parties or listed no party affiliation.

### Profile of Elected Deputies

As a result of three weekends of voting, 338 deputies were elected. This number constitutes the required quorum of two-thirds (300 deputies) of the 450-member Parliament. A new Parliament will convene on May 11, 1994.

A profile of the 338 elected deputies is as follows:

**Form of Registration**

Nominated by Labor Collectives	120
Nominated as Independents	129
Nominated by Parties	89
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>338</b>

*Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems*

**Party Affiliation as Listed in Biographies**

Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	5
Civil Congress of Ukraine	2
Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party	2
Ukrainian Republican Party	8
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine	1
Rukh	20
Democratic Party of Ukraine	2
Democratic Rebirth Party of Ukraine	4
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine	2
Labor Party	4
Peasant Party of Ukraine	18
Socialist Party	14
Communist Party of Ukraine	86
Non-Party	170
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>338</b>

*Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems*

### Results of Parliamentary Elections

District	# of Seats	Deputies Elected 3/27	Deputies Elected in Repeat Voting	Districts Failing 50% Turn-out	Districts Failing 25% for Candidates	Seats to be Filled 7/24/94
Kiev City	23	2	3	14	4	18
Crimea	19	1	8	0	10	10
Sevastopol	4	0	2	0	2	2
Vinnytsia	17	0	11	0	6	6
Vofyn	9	1	5	0	3	3
Dnipro-petrovsk	34	1	20	2	11	13
Donetsk	47	7	36	0	4	4
Zhytomyr	13	1	9	0	3	3
Zakarpattia	10	1	6	0	3	3
Zaporizhzhia	18	1	16	0	1	1
Ivano-Frankivsk	12	6	6	0	0	0
Kiev Oblast	17	2	10	0	5	5
Kirovohrad	11	0	8	0	3	3
Luhansk	25	7	17	0	1	1
Lviv	23	9	11	0	3	3
Mykolayiv	11	0	8	0	3	3
Odesa	23	1	18	0	4	4
Poltava	16	1	10	0	5	5
Rivne	10	0	8	0	2	2
Sumy	13	1	8	1	3	4
Ternopil	10	4	4	0	2	2
Kharkiv	28	0	24	3	1	4
Kherson	11	0	10	0	1	1
Khmelnysk	13	0	9	0	4	4
Cherkassy	13	0	8	0	5	5
Chernivtsi	8	1	5	0	2	2
Chernihiv	12	2	9	0	1	1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>112</b>

Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems

**APPENDIX I**  
**PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**



**N E W S R E L E A S E**

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**  
Monday, March 28, 1994

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**INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE  
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  
UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OBSERVATION  
KYIV, UKRAINE  
MARCH 27, 1994**

**SUMMARY**

The 15-member Election Observation Delegation of the International Republican Institute (IRI) found the March elections for Ukraine's Supreme Rada (Parliament) -- the first since independence from the USSR -- to be an important step in Ukraine's development as a democracy. However, if the goal of the election was to elect a Parliament with a higher degree of legitimacy and an electoral mandate, this election may fall short of the mark.

IRI applauds the courage, commitment and spirit of optimism of many candidates who participated for the first time in the political process. Notwithstanding some isolated incidents, IRI commends the citizens of Ukraine for their civilized, peaceful conduct during the campaign period -- a period marked by severe economic hardship and potential political uncertainty. Finally, the Ukrainian government deserves recognition for its efforts to promote ethnic harmony throughout the campaign period. Nevertheless, IRI observers believe that by enacting a flawed election law, Ukraine missed a critical opportunity to further develop, advance and consolidate political institutions and practices that are a necessary part of a flourishing democracy.

**BACKGROUND**

Since April 1993, IRI has maintained a field office in Kyiv, and has conducted political party training, civic education and an election preparation program in more than ten cities throughout the country.

Prior to election day, IRI observers convened in Kyiv for briefings by officials of Ukrainian political parties, representatives of the Central Election Commission (CEC), Ukrainian civic organizations, election law experts, candidates, and U.S. Embassy officials. Observers then deployed to five additional cities with geographic, political and ethnic diversity: Odesa, Simferopol, Lviv, Zhytomyr, and Kharkiv. Prior to election day in their respective cities, observers met with local representatives of political parties, Ukrainian media, domestic observer groups, district election commission officials, candidates and voters.

## THE ELECTION LAW

The weaknesses of the election had their origins in the new election law adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament in November 1993. By a vote of 245 to 6, with many pro-democratic deputies walking out in protest, the law was passed in a fractious and acrimonious atmosphere. It included certain provisions that set the stage for a complicated and potentially inconclusive election. Among the provisions:

- Representation by single-member seats, rather than a mixed system of single member representation and proportional representation by political party. (By excluding proportional representation, the importance of political parties and party platforms was diminished and coalition-building was discouraged.)
- Candidate nomination methods that encouraged a proliferation of independent individual candidates, but that created procedural obstacles for political party candidates and simplified procedures for labor collective candidates. (For example, developing political parties were required to nominate candidates in 450 separate local organizing meetings, rather than in district, regional or national nominating conventions.)
- A turnout threshold requirement of 50 percent of eligible voters to validate the election in each district. (This threshold requirement ignores the right of a citizen not to vote.)
- A requirement that a winning candidate receive a majority of the votes cast in that district, but no less than 25 percent of registered voters in that district. (This requirement virtually ensures run-off and/or repeat elections in a field of 5,839 candidates competing for 450 seats.)
- A "negative" voting methodology carried over from the Soviet era -- crossing out names of candidates the voter does not wish to elect. (This method can create potentially an unnecessarily high percentage of spoiled ballots, particularly in this election where some ballots contain as many as 33 names.)



## NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE ELECTION LAW

While IRI observers were informed of numerous violations reported around the country to the CEC, it was unable to find a single instance in which the CEC addressed these reports. Other complaints:

-- The CEC failed to produce a nationwide voter list, notwithstanding repeated requests from observer organizations and members of the news media. (Candidate lists were published only at the local level.)

-- Numerous domestic organizations wishing to become credentialed as nonpartisan observers as provided for in the law were precluded from doing so by a series of conflicting instructions and cumbersome requirements imposed by the CEC.

-- No nationwide figures of eligible voters were published to provide a reliable baseline upon which to determine turnout.

## MEDIA ACCESS

Observers spoke to political party representatives and candidates about media access. In general, television time was allotted to candidates, but observers heard consistent accounts that coverage was uneven, with "party of power" candidates receiving much greater access.

## CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Observers believe the campaign finance laws were too restrictive and that the spending limits were too low. Candidates were allowed to spend only 6 million coupons (US\$150), an insufficient amount to run a campaign and purchase adequate advertising in media outlets. As a result, this forced candidates to be dependent upon state media to communicate with the voters. Also, campaign funds were placed under the control of local constituency commissioners, allowing unnecessary monitoring of candidate campaign activity. Observers were told that the law frequently was ignored.

## POLITICAL PARTIES

Although more than 28 political parties exist in Ukraine, all are in their infancy. Party officials have been unable to build the necessary coalitions to become a viable force in Ukrainian politics. In these elections, only 11 percent of the candidates ran under a party label. Parties are weak and need to consolidate and develop broad-based philosophies and positions in order to act as a counterweight to existing power structures and attract voters. Unfortunately, the anti-party bias of this election law arrested party development.

Nevertheless, the dedication to democratic principles and ideals of many individuals committed to party development was remarkable. We believe their commitment and willingness to work for greater freedom of all citizens of an independent Ukraine is an inspiration.

#### ABSENCE OF NATIONAL DEBATE

One of the most striking observations of the election environment was the total absence of a debate on issues of national concern and importance. The absence of a proportional representation component in the election law ruled out the possibility of such a discussion. A Parliament comprised only of single-member districts stifled political party development, and focused this election not on issues, philosophies and ideas, but on individual popularity, and candidates' name recognition and existing status. Essentially, voters were deprived of all serious discussion of critical national issues and, as a result, a more meaningful basis on which to make an informed choice.

#### PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Some Ukrainians told IRI observers before the election that they felt helpless to affect a change in their political system. As one remarked: "I have no electricity in my apartment. How do they expect me to vote?" Many do not believe that voting empowers them to influence the government and affect change, and some are becoming alienated from the attempt to establish a democratic process. Rather, they feel powerless to change an overwhelming state bureaucracy, or "the party of power." This attitude is summed up by a comment made to an IRI observer, "We used to say they pretend to pay us, we pretend to work. Now, we pretend to vote, and they pretend to listen."

This disillusionment stood in contrast to remarks by some voters on election day that they thought their vote could have an impact.

#### LOCAL ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Polling station election officials were well-organized, and took seriously their duties and responsibilities. IRI observers were impressed by the openness, conscientiousness, friendliness and helpfulness of the station officials. IRI believes that the efforts displayed by local electoral officials and voters to transition to a truly democratic process represent the hope of the future of Ukraine.

IRI observers were encouraged by the presence of domestic observers at polling sites, who, likewise, were dedicated to the concept of openness.

IRI observed numerous technical violations of the law which result from hold-over practices such as "family voting," voting outside the voting booth, and using the passports of others to obtain ballots and cast votes. IRI believes a more serious effort to educate the

voters and electoral officials on the importance of adherence to the law is necessary in future elections.

#### RUN-OFF RECOMMENDATIONS

IRI observers encourage the CEC to determine the final results as quickly as possible in order to provide an adequate campaign period for run-off candidates. It is unclear whether a sufficient number of candidates will be elected to form a parliamentary quorum after two rounds of voting.

#### A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

The absence of a new, post-communist Constitution has far-reaching consequences, not only for this election, but for both the short- and long-term future of Ukraine. Absent a clear delineation of power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, as well as among national, regional and local governments, uncertainty will continue to plague the country.

#### THE CRIMEA

IRI observers are dismayed by any action of an elected official designed to discourage people from voting. Our observers noted that in spite of such an action, the majority of Crimean residents did not heed such a call.

#### CONTINUING IRI OBSERVATION

This election is not over. IRI's election observation will continue in the coming days and weeks as the final results are reported and a second round of voting occurs.

#### CONCLUSION

There remain questions about the speed with which democratic institutions can consolidate and overcome the legacy of past practices. The pace of democratization and reform in Ukraine is painfully slow, but can gain strength over time. Ukraine's transition is clearly dependent not only on free elections, but also on its ability to develop political parties and harness the overwhelming desire of the population to cast off the yoke of the past.

It is our most sincere hope that Ukraine will accelerate the empowerment of its people and move quickly with economic and political reform so that all its citizens can reap the benefits of a government responsive to the electorate. Only then will Ukrainians have the democracy they so richly deserve.

**APPENDIX II**  
**UKRAINE'S NEWLY ELECTED DEPUTIES**

## UKRAINE'S NEWLY ELECTED DEPUTIES

KIEV-CITY				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16	Horbatiuk, Myroslav	RUKH	Party/Bloc	50.43 %
17	Lanovy, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	58.32 %
18	Zayets, Ivan	RUKH	Voters Group	59.96 %
19	Holovatiy, Serhiy	Independent	Voters Group	50.07 %
20				
21				
22				
23	Kostenko, Yuriy	RUKH	Voters Group	52.19 %

CRIMEA				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
24				
25				

<b>CRIMEA</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
26				
27				
28	Karpachova, Nina	Independent	Workers Collective	70.35%
29	Pylypenko, Mykola	Independent	Voters Group	56.95%
30				
31				
32	Starovoitova, Halyna	Independent	Workers Collective	53.11%
33				
34	Doroshevskiy, Mykhailo	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	53.31%
35				
36	Kochen, Yuriy	Independent	Workers Collective	56.96%
37	Horbatov, Valeriy	Independent	Workers Collective	57.08%
38	Krandakova, Olena	Independent	Voters Group	61.45%
39				
40	Pshenychna, Olha	Independent	Workers Collective	56.70%
41				
42	Pimenova, Natalia	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	56.92%

<b>SEVASTOPOL CITY</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
43	Bobrynirov, Oleksander	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	50.26%
44	Sherenin, Yuriy	Independent	Voters Group	55.25%
45				
46				

<b>VINNITSIA</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
47				
48				
49	Kviatkovskiy, Ihor	Independent	Workers Collective	54.17%

VINNITSIA				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
50				
51	Parasunko, Mykhailo	Independent	Workers Collective	52.50%
52	Briauzov, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	51.83%
53	Yarovenko, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	50.15%
54				
55				
56	Lantukh, Vasyl	Communist Party	Voters Group	55.38%
57	Nedvyha, Hryhoriy	Independent	Workers Collective	68.97%
58	Stretovych, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	65.24%
59	Butkevych, Volodymyr	Independent	Voters Group	61.69%
60				
61	Smirnov, Yevhen	Independent	Voters Group	52.83%
62	Stoyan, Oleksander	Independent	Workers Collective	54.99%
63	Piskunovskiy, Konstantyn	Independent	Voters Group	58.67%

VOLYN				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
64	Zhulynksiy, Mykola	Independent	Voters Group	66.68%
65				
66	Skipalskiy, Oleksander	Independent	Voters Group	54.58%
67	Mostyskiy, Andriy	Independent	Voters Group	51.61%
68				
69	Vashchuk, Kateryna	Independent	Workers Collective	61.81%
70	Buteyko, Anton	Independent	Workers Collective	69.38%
71				
72	Korneliuk, Vasyl	Independent	Workers Collective	73.37%

DNIPROPETROVSK				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
73				
74				
75	Ryabchenko, Oleksander	Independent	Voters Group	64.07%
76	Mykhailenko, Serhiy	Democratic Rebirth Party	Voters Group	67.32%
77	Kostiuchenko, Leonid	Independent	Workers Collective	59.84%
78	Merkushov, Victor	Independent	Workers Collective	55.70%
79				
80				
81	Chukmasov, Serhiy	Independent	Voters Group	73.73%
82	Shybko, Vitaliy	Socialist Party	Voters Group	53.80%
83				
84	Hamaniuk, Leonid	Independent	Workers Collective	63.34%
85	Koropenko, Anton	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	55.25%
86				
87	Stepaniuk, Dmytro	Independent	Workers Collective	62.09%
88	Kocherha, Victor	Labor Party	Workers Collective	51.72%
89	Melnyk, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	54.52%
90	Hurov, Vadym	Labor Party	Workers Collective	65.24%
91	Borodich, Leonid	Independent	Workers Collective	57.28%
92				
93				
94	Liashchenko, Konstiantyn	Independent	Voters Group	66.18%
95				
96				
97	Babych, Valeriy	Independent	Voters Group	51.21%
98				
99	Chulakov, Yevhen	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	58.59%
100	Omelich, Victor	Independent	Voters Group	55.34%
101	Tykhonov, Yuriy	Independent	Voters Group	69.73%
102	Sadko, Volodymyr	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	58.50%



DNIPROPETROVSK				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
103	Kharlamov, Viktor	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	54.51%
104				
105				
106	Harkaviy, Vitaliy	Independent	Workers Collective	61.30%

DONETSK				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
107	Shcherban, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	78.40%
108	Kiyashko, Serhiy	Socialist Party	Party/Bloc	57.86%
109				
110	Zvyahilskiy, Yukhym	Independent	Workers Collective	57.49%
111	Pysarenko, Anatoliy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	55.15%
112	Boldyrev, Yuriy	Civil Congress	Workers Collective	50.33%
113	Kozhevnykov, Borys	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	65.85%
114	Landyk, Valentyn	Independent	Workers Collective	59.14%
115	Azarov, Mykola	Labor Party	Party/Bloc	52.16%
116	Ampilohov, Volodymyr	Independent	Voters Group	54.69%
117	Cherepkov, Volodymyr	Socialist Party	Voters Group	50.85%
118	Krasniakov, Yevhen	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	76.89%
119	Sikalov, Valeriy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	60.31%
120	Vyshnyvetsky, Heorhiy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	52.94%
121	Samofalov, Henadiy	Independent	Party/Bloc	66.43%
122	Kocherha, Victor	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	77.54%
123	Okhrimenko, Kostiantyn	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	56.99%
124	Yakovenko, Oleksander	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	52.28%
125	Chechetov, Mykhailo	Independent	Workers Collective	50.86%
126	Pasechna, Liudmyla	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	58.46%
127	Kuznetsov, Pavlo	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	68.74%
128	Shehovtsov, Oleksiy	Independent	Voters Group	60.56%
129	Zavarzin, Mykola	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	66.61%

DONETSK				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
130	Khunov, Anatoliy	Communist Party	Voters Group	57.46%
131	Moiseyenko, Volodymyr	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	56.65%
132	Tatarynov, Anatoliy	Independent	Workers Collective	64.83%
133				
134	Pudryk, Valeriy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	57.70%
135	Pozhyvanov, Mykhailo	Independent	Voters Group	50.77%
136	Miroshnychenko, Luidvyh	Independent	Voters Group	56.24%
137	Shestakov, Victor	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	55.11%
138	Tereshchuk, Vasyl	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	53.91%
139				
140	Khmeliiovyy, Anatoliy	Communist Party	Workers Collective	68.21%
141	Kaminskiy, Leonid	Socialist Party	Workers Collective	61.28%
142	Surhay, Mykola	Independent	Workers Collective	50.83%
143	Peyhalaynen, Anatoliy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	77.94%
144	Shamaryn, Oleksander	Communist Party	Workers Collective	50.73%
145	Kozhushko, Oleksander	Independent	Workers Collective	56.20%
146	Motsman, Anatoliy	Independent	Voters Group	57.93%
147	Panasovskiy, Oleh	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	89.44%
148	Shcherban, Yevhen	Independent	Voters Group	55.76%
149	Dondyk, Mykola	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	59.91%
150	Symonenko, Petro	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	63.98%
151	Oleksienko, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	59.67%
152				
153	Petrenko, Anatoliy	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	59.79%

ZHYTOMYR				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
154	Mozer, Heorhiy	Communist Party	Workers Collective	53.92%
155				
156	Chykal, Adam	Independent	Voters Group	66.88%

<b>ZHYTOMYR</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
157	Yatsenko, Volodymyr	Communist Party	Workers Collective	52.10%
158	Horbatyuk, Mykola	Independent	Voters Group	61.25%
159	Semeniuk, Valentyna	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	50.62%
160	Mosiychuk, Serhiy	Peasants Party	Voters Group	56.75%
161				
162	Sydorenko, Hryhoriy	Independent	Workers Collective	74.08%
163	Rudchenko, Mykola	Independent	Workers Collective	52.68%
164	Kalnyk, Viktor	Independent	Workers Collective	68.89%
165	Spizhenko, Yuriy	Independent	Workers Collective	58.63%
166				

<b>ZAKARPATTIA</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
167				
168	Ulynets, Vasyl	Independent	Workers Collective	50.13%
169	Tovt, Mykhaylo	Independent	Voters Group	62.19%
170	Cheypesh, Serhiy	Christian Democratic Party	Voters Group	53.80%
171	Ustych, Serhiy	Independent	Workers Collective	61.35%
172	Klympush, Orest	Independent	Workers Collective	58.61%
173				
174	Korshynskiy, Ivan	Independent	Voters Group	57.08%
175	Dancha, Mykhailo	Independent	Voters Group	56.07%
176				

<b>ZAPORIZHZHIA</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
177	Syzenko, Yuriy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	54.84%
178	Anisimov, Leonid	Independent	Workers Collective	73.31%
179	Kuzmenko, Serhiy	Communist Party	Workers Collective	74.06%

<b>ZAPORIZHZHIA</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
180	Taran, Mykola	Communist Party	Workers Collective	53.48%
181	Kuzhel, Oleksandra	Independent	Workers Collective	65.68%
182	Ponedilko, Victor	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	69.16%
183	Soboliev, Serhiy	Democratic Rebirth Party	Voters Group	63.89%
184	Sudnytsyn, Fedir	Independent	Voters Group	52.67%
185	Todorov, Yevhen	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	50.76%
186	Uharov, Hennadiy	Independent	Workers Collective	57.01%
187				
188	Holubchenko, Anatoliy	Independent	Voters Group	61.60%
189	Bielskiy, Viacheslav	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	56.43%
190	Oliynyk, Borys	Communist Party	Workers Collective	56.14%
191	Luniuov, Hryhoriy	Peasants Party	Voters Group	57.74%
192	Tkachenko, Stepan	Independent	Workers Collective	57.86%
193	Yermak, Anatoliy	Independent	Voters Group	67.79%
194	Bryt, Victor	Socialist Party	Party/Bloc	53.30%

<b>IVANO-FRANKIVSK</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
195	Kostytsky, Vasyl	Independent	Voters Group	60.67%
196	Pylypchuk, Volodymyr	Independent	Voters Group	57.62%
197	Muliava, Volodymyr	Independent	Voters Group	63.48%
198	Movchan, Pavlo	Independent	Workers Collective	57.91%
199	Volkovetskiy, Stepan	Independent	Party/Bloc	61.20%
200	Shpek, Roman	Independent	Workers Collective	50.07%
201	Kostytsky, Mykhailo	Independent	Workers Collective	61.95%
202	Krutsyk, Roman	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	Voters Group	58.04%
203	Kozhyn, Borys	Independent	Voters Group	52.20%
204	Hryhorovych, Liliya	Independent	Voters Group	52.18%
205	Proniuk, Yevhen	Ukrainian Republican Party	Voters Group	52.06%

IVANO-FRANKIVSK				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
206	Osadchuk, Petro	Independent	Workers Collective	50.90%

KIEVSKA				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
207				
208				
209	Novikov, Oleksander	Independent	Workers Collective	74.49%
210	Zasukha, Anatoliiy	Independent	Workers Collective	60.12%
211				
212				-
213	Shevchenko, Vitaliy	РУКН	Voters Group	57.85%
214	Nidziev, Oleksander	Independent	Workers Collective	56.04%
215	Kravchuk, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	52.14%
216				
217	Linchak, Mykhailo	Independent	Voters Group	55.57%
218	Kyrymov, Ivan	Independent	Workers Collective	66.32%
219	Zhovtiak, Yevhen	РУКН	Voters Group	60.38%
220	Bezsmertniy, Roman	Ukrainian Republican Party	Party/Bloc	54.12%
221	Danylenko, Anatoliiy	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	68.17%
222	Kulinich, Victor	РУКН	Voters Group	68.77%
223	Moroz, Oleksander	Socialist Party	Workers Collective	62.14%

KIROVOHRAD				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
224	Alioshyn, Valeriy	РУКН	Party/Bloc	53.19%
225	Mishura, Valeriy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	50.36%
226	Salanskiy, Anatoliiy	Communist Party	Workers Collective	66.91%
227				
228	Yavorivsky, Volodymyr	Democratic Party	Voters Group	51.89%

KIROVOHRAD				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
229	Durdynets, Vasyl	Independent	Workers Collective	53.27%
230				
231	Sas, Serhiy	Independent	Workers Collective	70.41%
232				
233	Tselykh, Yuriy	Communist Party	Workers Collective	52.73%
234	Marmazov, Yevhen	Communist Party	Workers Collective	56.80%

LUHANSK				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
235	Yahoferov, Anatoliy	Independent	Workers Collective	50.11%
236	Stepanov, Petro	Communist Party	Voters Group	61.96%
237	Iliushyn, Volodymyr	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	60.25%
238	Borzykh, Oleksander	Independent	Voters Group	52.80%
239	Kolomoitsev, Valeriy	Independent	Voters Group	53.83%
240	Hmyria, Serhiy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	67.37%
241	Yeskov, Valentyn	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	64.24%
242	Sinchenko, Serhiy	Independent	Voters Group	61.98%
243	Levchenko, Anatoliy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	54.69%
244	Dmytrenko, Oleksiy	Independent	Voters/Group	51.09%
245	Anenkov, Yehor	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	52.28%
246	Kryzskiy, Yuriy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	72.47%
247	Kocherha, Volodymyr	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	64.08%
248				
249	Tsybenko, Petro	Communist	Party/Bloc	61.31%
250	Dyneykin, Hryhoriy	Independent	Voters Group	70.02%
251	Churuta, Mykhailo	Communist Party	Voters Group	76.12%
252	Bondarenko, Victor	Independent	Workers Collective	65.97%
253	Cherenkov, Oleksander	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	56.67%
254	Aksyonenko, Serhiy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	72.90%
255	Petrenko, Dmytro	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	56.55%

LUHANSK				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
256	Stashenko, Oleksander	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	59.85 %
257	Stepanov, Mykhailo	Socialist Party	Voters Group	73.23 %
258	Ulanov, Valentyn	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	73.37 %
259	Donchenko, Yuriy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	50.31 %

LVIV				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
260				
261	Khmara, Stepan	Conservative Republican Party	Voters Group	54.41 %
262				
263	Yuhnovsky, Ihor	Independent	Workers Collective	60.41 %
264	Pynzenyk, Victor	Independent	Voters Group	64.66 %
265				
266	Shandriuk, Oleksander	Ukrainian Republican Party	Party/Bloc	83.44 %
267	Taniuk, Les	RUKH	Party/Bloc	58.56 %
268	Protseviat, Taras	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	Workers Collective	55.64 %
269	Ostash, Ihor	Independent	Voters Group	87.44 %
270	Zherebetskiy, Yevhen	Independent	Voters Group	52.23 %
271	Chobit, Dmytro	RUKH	Party/Bloc	55.27 %
272	Koliushko, Ihor	Independent	Voters Group	50.57 %
273	Stetskiv, Taras	Democratic Rebirth Party	Workers Collective	61.98 %
274	Lavrynovych, Oleksander	RUKH	Voters Group	51.50 %
275	Vitovich, Oleh	Independent	Voters Group	57.55 %
276	Shvydkiy, Petro	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	Voters Group	77.91 %
277	Hlukhivskiy, Lev	Independent	Voters Group	58.14 %
278	Bilas, Ivan	Independent	Party/Bloc	55.74 %
279	Kosiv, Mykhailo	RUKH	Party/Bloc	72.05 %

<b>LVIV</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
280	Kendzyor, Yaroslav	RUKH	Party/Bloc	57.13%
281	Demyan, Hrihoriy	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	Party/Bloc	57.77%
282	Ilyasevych, Yaroslav	Independent	Voters Group	74.07%

<b>MYKOLAYIV</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
283	Yemelyanov, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	54.33%
284				
285	Bozhenko, Oleh	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	53.84%
286	Zaporozhets, Yuriy	Independent	Voters Group	55.78%
287				
288	Platovskiy, Yevhen	Independent	Voters Group	68.30%
289				
290	Hluch, Ivan	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	61.03%
291	Polomarchiuk, Valeriy	Independent	Voters Group	57.36%
292	Chyviuk, Mykola	Communist Party	Voters Group	74.73%
293	Shkrabak, Pavlo	Communist Party	Workers Collective	53.86%

<b>ODESSA</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
294	Hurvits, Eduard	Independent	Workers Collective	53.12%
295	Dragomaretskiy, Serhiy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	51.26%
296	Shyshkin, Victor	Independent	Workers Collective	68.92%
297				
298	Symonenko, Valentyn	Independent	Workers Collective	50.40%
299	Karmazin, Yuriy	Independent	Workers Collective	60.29%
300	Kudiukin, Pavlo	Independent	Workers Collective	69.12%
301	Yevdokimov, Valeriy	Independent	Voters Group	52.05%
302				



ODESSA				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
303				
304	Honchar, Vasyl	Independent	Voters Group	70.47 %
305				
306	Melnyk, Petro	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	64.08 %
307	Plotkin, Vadym	Independent	Workers Collective	66.71 %
308	Popov, Dmytro	Independent	Workers Collective	64.38 %
309	Neimyrovskiy, Volodymyr	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	71.52 %
310	Miyaskovskiy, Mykhailo	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	52.59 %
311	Hovorun, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	50.60 %
312	Bodelan, Ruslan	Independent	Voters Group	55.91 %
313	Titenko, Valeriy	Peasants Party	Voters Group	50.55 %
314	Sokerchak, Viacheslav	Communist Party	Workers Collective	63.15 %
315	Tsushko, Vasyl	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	68.57 %
316	Richagov, Hryhoriy	Social Democratic Party	Voters Group	62.11 %

POLTAVA				
Okruh	Candidate	Party/Affiliation	Nominated	% of Votes
317	Bilous, Viacheslav	Independent	Voters Group	50.75 %
318	Holovko, Volodymyr	Independent	Voters Group	52.72 %
319	Nosov, Vladyslav	Independent	Voters Group	64.79 %
320				
321	Teren, Victor	Independent	Voters Group	56.29 %
322	Omelchenko, Hryhoriy	Independent	Voters Group	61.89 %
323				
324				
325	Kovalko, Mykhailo	Independent	Workers Collective	57.64 %
326	Kivshyk, Petro	Independent	Workers Collective	51.42 %
327	Kapustian, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	55.92 %
328				
329	Kyrychenko, Mykola	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	57.86 %

<b>POLTAVA</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
330	Masenko, Oleksander	Communist Party	Voters Group	58.41%
331	Stepenko, Vasyl	Peasants Party	Voters Group	50.04%
332				

<b>RIVNE</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
333	Kovtunets, Volodymyr	RUKH	Party/Bloc	56.36%
334	Omelchuk, Roman	RUKH	Party/Bloc	56.87%
335	Chervoniy, Vasyl	RUKH	Party/Bloc	54.76%
336				-
337	Yaroshinskiy, Bohdan	Ukrainian Republican Party	Party/Bloc	53.63%
338	Homich, Mykola	Independent	Workers Collective	51.52%
339	Matkovskiy, Oleh	RUKH	Voters Group	61.22%
340				
341	Porovskiy, Mykola	Ukrainian Republican Party	Party/Bloc	65.92%
342	Buryachinskiy, Oleksander	Independent	Workers Collective	70.55%

<b>SUMY</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
343				
344				
345	Lavrinenko, Mykola	Socialist Party	Party/Bloc	55.94%
346	Yurkovskiy, Vitaliy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	52.75%
347	Tkacheenko, Volodymyr	RUKH	Voters Group	50.44%
348	Marchenko, Volodymyr	Socialist Party	Voters Group	58.67%
349	Storizhko, Volodymyr	Independent	Voters Group	56.42%
350	Cherep, Valeriy	Independent	Workers Collective	66.07%
351	Radko, Vasyl	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	77.66%
352				

<b>SUMY</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
353	Cherniavskiy, Oleksiy	Peasants Party	Voters Group	51.15%
354	Bublyk, Yuriy	Communist Party	Workers Collective	62.04%
355				

<b>TERNOPIIL</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
356				
357	Chornovil, Vyacheslav	RUKH	Party/Bloc	62.52%
358	Horohivskiy, Leon	Ukrainian Republican Party	Party/Bloc	69.36%
359	Horbai, Mykola	Ukrainian Republican Party	Party/Bloc	50.40%
360	Boiko, Bohdan	Independent	Party/Bloc	58.52%
361	Ratushniy, Mykhailo	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	Voters Group	51.22%
362	Zarudniy, Andriy	RUKH	Party/Bloc	60.69%
363				
364	Kuper, Roman	Conservative Republican Party	Party/Bloc	59.09%
365	Tyma, Yuriy	Independent	Voters Group	51.57%

<b>KHARKIV</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
366				
367				
368	Kashliakov, Mykola	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	56.20%
369	Alekseyev, Volodymyr	Civil Congress	Voters Group	58.53%
370	Muhin, Volodymyr	Socialist Party	Party/Bloc	51.74%
371	Dyomin, Oleh	Independent	Voters Group	53.55%
372	Taranov, Oleh	Independent	Voters Group	67.75%
373	Karpov, Oleksander	Independent	Voters Group	63.41%

<b>KHARKIV</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
374				
375	Harmash, Leonid	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	57.63 %
376	Hrynyov, Volodymyr	Democratic Rebirth Party	Voters Group	75.64 %
377				
378	Musiyaka, Victor	Independent	Voters Group	52.79 %
379	Chornousenko, Oleh	Independent	Voters Group	56.63 %
380	Didyk, Petro	Independent	Workers Collective	59.49 %
381	Chupahin, Oleksander	Socialist Party	Voters Group	51.78 %
382	Bychenko, Mykola	Communist Party	Voters Group	60.66 %
383	Suslov, Victor	Independent	Workers Collective	61.31 %
384	Pustovoitovskiy, V.	Communist Party	Workers Collective	55.87 %
385	Raikovskiy, Bronislav	Communist Party	Workers Collective	51.62 %
386	Hoshovska, Valentyna	Independent	Workers Collective	68.02 %
387	Karasyk, Vladlen	Independent	Workers Collective	56.68 %
388	Olhovskiy, Borys	Independent	Voters Group	51.58 %
389	Kosolapov, Anatoliy	Independent	Workers Collective	60.81 %
390	Bandurka, Oleksander	Independent	Workers Collective	70.11 %
391	Berezhniy, Oleksiy	Independent	Voters Group	55.84 %
392	Kudrevych, Oleksander	Independent	Voters Group	59.30 %
393	Ivanov, Vasyl	Communist Party	Voters Group	70.13 %

<b>KHERSON</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
394	Yelyashkevych, Oleksandr	Independent	Workers Collective	73.11 %
395	Kyrychenko, Serhiy	Independent	Workers Collective	52.85 %
396	Naida, Heorhiy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	50.74 %
397				
398	Bezhlly, Anatoliy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	65.32 %
399	Snigach, Andriy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	66.67 %
400	Dovhan, Serhiy	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	60.08 %

<b>KHERSON</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
401	Slastion, Yuriy	Independent	Workers Collective	60.28%
402	Nikolayenko, Stanislav	Socialist Party	Workers Collective	66.67%
403	Samoilik, Kateryna	Communist Party	Workers Collective	51.89%
404	Malevskiy, Oleksander	Communist Party	Workers Collective	54.58%

<b>KHMELNYTSK</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
405				
406	Pavlovskiy, Mykhailo	Ukrainian Republican Party	Voters Group	59.40%
407	Yablonskiy, Valentyn	Independent	Voters Group	54.36%
408				
409	Verhohliad, Vasyl	Independent	Voters Group	69.84%
410	Holovko, Anatoliy	Independent	Workers Collective	50.25%
411	Vinskiy, Yosip	Socialist Party	Party/Bloc	58.23%
412	Yakovenko, Valentyn	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	59.14%
413	Bortnyk, Volodymyr	Independent	Workers Collective	63.01%
414	Chyzh, Ivan	Socialist Party	Voters Group	59.94%
415				
416	Sviato, Vasyl	Independent	Voters Group	58.85%
417				

<b>CHERKASSY</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
418	Syrota, Mykhailo	Independent	Voters Group	55.19%
419				
420				
421				
422				
423	Royenko, Victor	Communist Party	Voters Group	67.81%

<b>CHERKASSY</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
424	Parubok, Omelyan	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	50.17%
425	Pasko, Serhiy	Independent	Voters Group	63.97%
426				
427	Karasyk, Yuriy	Independent	Workers Collective	59.11%
428	Vasiura, Ivan	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	92.94%
429	Dusheiko, Petro	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	60.03%
430	Tkachenko, Oleksander	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	58.46%

<b>CHERNIVETSKA</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
431	Kiyak, Taras	Democratic Party	Workers Collective	51.17%
432				
433				
434	Popesku, Ivan	Independent	Voters Groups	52.06%
435	Manchulenko, Heorhiy	RUKH	Voters Groups	50.99%
436	Dovhanchyn, Hryhoriy	Independent	Workers Collectives	61.55%
437	Fylypcyk, Heorhiy	Independent	Workers Collectives	59.67%
438	Buzduhan, Yuriy	Social Democratic Party	Voters Group	64.53%

<b>CHERNIHIV</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
439	Stepanov, Oleksander	Independent	Workers Collective	50.52%
440	Symonenko, Ivan	Labor Party	Workers Collective	63.30%
441	Chumachenko, Mykola	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	66.67%
442				
443	Chumak, Mykola	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	72.19%
444	Sheyko, Petro	Independent	Voters Groups	50.33%
445	Pliushch, Ivan	Independent	Workers Collective	71.44%
446	Masol, Vitaliy	Independent	Workers Collective	69.03%
447	Borovyk, Oleksander	Peasants Party	Workers Collective	58.22%

<b>CHERNIHIV</b>				
<b>Okruh</b>	<b>Candidate</b>	<b>Party/Affiliation</b>	<b>Nominated</b>	<b>% of Votes</b>
448	Kuchma, Leonid	Independent	Voters Group	90.41%
449	Dron, Anatoliy	Independent	Workers Collective	50.45%
450	Dolzhenko, Hennadiy	Communist Party	Party/Bloc	58.87%

*Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems*



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